Example of nonrival: asteroid deflection protects 7 billion people for the same cost as protecting 1 million.
Two questions, excludable and rival, sort every good into four types and tell you when markets work and when they fail.
Markets provide food, clothing and phones very well. But they underprovide some goods, like asteroid deflection and national defense, and overuse others, like ocean tuna.
Is the good excludable? Is it rival? The answers sort every good into four types.
Free riders, forced riders, and why markets underprovide or misprice nonrival goods.
Why unowned resources get overused, and the fixes that work: norms and property rights.
Can non-payers be kept out? Does one person’s use reduce another’s?
Example of nonrival: asteroid deflection protects 7 billion people for the same cost as protecting 1 million.
Why markets provide one well and underprovide the other.
Sellers can exclude non-payers, so there is an incentive to produce. The only people excluded are those unwilling or unable to pay the cost, and that isn’t inefficient.
You can’t easily charge users, so it is hard to get anyone to pay voluntarily.
Excludable but nonrival.
Nonexcludable but rival.
Groups around the world have avoided overfishing and overgrazing by enforcing shared norms. This gets harder as more unrelated users gain access.
In 1968 British Columbia capped the number of fishing boats. Fishermen responded with “capital stuffing” (bigger engines, better electronics). Boat values tripled while the salmon fishery kept declining.
Individual transferable quotas: each is a right to a set tonnage, the quotas sum to the total allowable catch, and they can be traded. It worked, and the fish catch rose.
A public good: nonrival (your watching doesn’t dim mine) and nonexcludable (it’s hard to stop non-payers from looking up).
A free rider.
Nonexcludability. It breaks the incentive to pay.
Some people who would pay the near-zero marginal cost, but not the price, are excluded.
The tragedy of the commons.
ITQs: individual transferable quotas, tradable rights to a set tonnage of catch.
Two properties, excludable and rival, sort goods into private goods, club goods, common resources and public goods.
Valuable but undersupplied by markets. Nonexcludability is the bigger problem, and it is the main argument for government taxation and supply.
Common resources tend to be overused and undermaintained: the tragedy of the commons.
Enforced norms or new property rights (ITQs) can prevent the tragedy where blunt limits fail.