A firm facing a downward-sloping demand curve has to cut the price to sell one more unit. That single fact puts marginal revenue below price — and everything else in this chapter follows from it.
Running example: Combivir, the AIDS drugAlso covers: price discrimination, bundling & versioningDrag the sliders on the live diagrams
Market powerThe hook
The same pill, at twenty-five times the price
$0.50What a Combivir pill costs to produce — and what an equivalent pill sold for in India, which did not recognize the patent.
$12.50What the same pill sold for in the United States, where GlaxoSmithKline held the patent.
50%The fall in U.S. AIDS deaths between 1995 and 1997, after drugs like Combivir arrived.
Since 1981 AIDS has killed over 40 million people. The Indian price sits essentially at marginal cost; the U.S. price sits far above it. The whole gap is market power — and this chapter is about where it comes from, what it costs, and what it buys.
PART ONE
What market power is
Not the power to charge anything you like — the power to charge above marginal cost without someone undercutting you.
Market powerDefinitions
Pricing above marginal cost, without fear of entry
Market power
The power to raise price above marginal cost without fear that other firms will enter the market.
Monopoly
A firm with market power.
Note how low the bar is: “monopoly” here does not require being the only seller on earth. It requires only that nobody can readily undercut you.
GlaxoSmithKline’s patent gave it the exclusive right to make, use, and sell Combivir.
That exclusivity blocked competition — and the blocked competition is the market power.
Remove the patent, as India did, and the price collapses to marginal cost. Same drug, same factory costs, completely different price.
PART TWO
Why marginal revenue falls below price
The competitive firm could sell all it wanted at the market price. A firm with market power cannot — and the arithmetic of that is the heart of the chapter.
Marginal revenueThe logic
The price cut applies to every unit, not just the last one
MR < P for any firm facing a downward-sloping demand curve
THE COMPETITIVE CASE
MR = P
The firm is small enough to sell as much as it likes at the going price. One more unit adds exactly the price to revenue. Nothing is given up.
WITH MARKET POWER
MR < P
To sell one more unit the firm must cut the price — and the lower price applies to every unit, including the ones it could have sold at the old, higher price. The extra revenue is the new sale minus that loss on all the rest.
Live diagramDrag quantity
Watch marginal revenue fall away from price
1
Price
—
Total revenue
—
Marginal revenue
—
Gap, P − MR
—
—
Live diagramDrag quantity
Same intercept, twice the slope
DemandMarginal revenueThe gap you give up
1
Price on D
—
MR
—
Total revenue
—
—
For a straight-line demand curve, MR starts at the same point on the vertical axis and falls twice as fast.
PART THREE
How a monopolist maximizes profit
The rule is the one from Chapter 11 — produce where MR = MC. What changes is where the price comes from.
Profit maximizationThe rule
Quantity off MR = MC. Price off the demand curve.
The profit-maximizing rule is unchanged: keep producing while the next unit adds more revenue than cost, and stop where MR = MC.
What changes is the price. The competitive firm read its price off a flat line. The monopolist reads it off the demand curve, at the quantity it chose.
Because MR lies below demand, that price sits above marginal cost — and the gap is the profit per unit.
The monopoly rule
Pick Q where MR = MC, then charge the price the demand curve will bear at that Q.π = (P − AC) × Q
Combivir, by the numbers
MR = MC at 80 million pills; price off demand $12.50; profit $10.00 a pill → $800 million.
Live diagramDrag quantity
Finding Combivir’s 80 million pills
DemandMRMC = AC = $2.50Profit
20
Price off demand
—
Marginal revenue
—
Profit per pill
—
Total profit
—
—
Profit maximizationElasticity
The less price-sensitive the buyer, the bigger the markup
The more inelastic demand is, the larger the markup of price over marginal cost the firm can sustain.
Two effects make prescription-drug demand unusually inelastic:
“You can’t take it with you.” The seriously ill are not sensitive to the price of a life-saving drug.
“Other people’s money.” When an insurer pays the bill, the buyer barely registers the price.
The markup rule
At the profit-maximizing quantity, the proportional markup is the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand.(P − MC) / P = 1 / |e|
Combivir’s $12.50 price on a $2.50 average cost implies an elasticity of just 1.25 — demand barely more elastic than the point where a monopolist stops raising price at all.
Live diagramDrag elasticity
Rotate the demand curve, watch the markup
1.25
Monopoly price
—
Marginal cost
$2.50
Markup over MC
—
(P − MC) / P
—
—
PART FOUR
What monopoly costs
Higher prices and smaller output mean trades that would have made both sides better off simply never happen.
Live diagramDrag quantity
The sales that never happen
Consumer surplusProducer surplusDeadweight loss
80
Price
—
Consumer surplus
—
Producer surplus
—
Total surplus
—
Deadweight loss
—
—
The costs of monopolyCorruption & inefficiency
Many monopolies exist to move wealth, not to make anything
INDONESIA
The clove monopoly
The president’s son, Tommy Suharto, was handed the national monopoly on cloves — and spent the proceeds on Lamborghinis. No new product, no lower cost; just a transfer to someone politically connected.
ALGERIA
“General Wheat,” “General Tire”
Army generals each controlled a key input. Monopolies on inputs to other goods are especially damaging: every general grabs a bigger slice while the whole pie shrinks.
This is the part of monopoly that has no offsetting benefit at all — no innovation bought, no scale economy captured.
PART FIVE
Where market power comes from
Four big sources: economies of scale, barriers to entry, network effects, and innovation.
SourcesEconomies of scale
When splitting the market just duplicates the cost
Natural monopoly: one firm can supply the whole market at lower cost than two or more could — water, natural gas, cable TV. With average cost falling across the whole market, splitting production just duplicates the fixed cost.
1
Output per firm
—
Average cost
—
Total industry cost
—
—
SourcesBarriers, networks, innovation
Three more ways to keep rivals out
Barriers to entry
Factors that raise the cost for new firms to enter an industry — hard-to-duplicate inputs, brands and trademarks, or an entrenched relationship with the market, like the TI-84 calculator.
Network effects
The product gets more valuable as more people use it. Facebook (everyone wants to be where their friends are); credit cards (buyers want acceptance, merchants want users).
Innovation
Products rivals cannot immediately copy.
The trade-off in one sentence: iPhones cost more than they would under stronger competition — but Apple would not innovate as hard without the prospect of monopoly profits.
Hold onto that sentence. It is the same bargain the patent system makes, and the one the next section has to price.
SourcesAt a glance
Where market power actually comes from
Source of market power
Example
Patents
GSK’s patent on Combivir
Laws preventing entry
Indonesian cloves, Algerian wheat, the U.S. Postal Service
Developing a new drug costs over $1 billion. Patents — temporary monopolies — are one way to reward that spending.
Drug prices are lower in India (weak patents) and Canada (price controls). But if nobody grants patent profits, fewer new drugs get developed at all.
Prizes
Reward the R&D directly, without creating a monopoly at all.
Patent buyouts
Government buys the patent and releases it, cutting the price without cutting the R&D reward — though it must raise taxes to pay, and pricing a patent correctly is hard.
PolicyRegulating monopoly
Three levers, each with a catch
LEVER 1
Price controls
Unlike in a competitive market, a well-placed price ceiling on a monopoly can increase output and consumer surplus. The catch: it dulls the incentive to innovate.
LEVER 2
Government ownership
About 3,000 U.S. electric utilities — two-thirds government-owned, the rest heavily regulated — delivered cheap power for decades. The catch: without competition or a profit motive, inefficiency creeps in; and without regulation, providers exploit their power (California, 2000).
LEVER 3
Antitrust law
The Sherman Act (1890) and Clayton Act (1914) let government break up monopolies, block mergers, and stop anticompetitive acts. The catch: bigger firms bring scale efficiencies and more market power — regulators must weigh lower costs against higher prices.
PART SIX
Price discrimination
So far the monopolist has charged everyone the same price. That is almost never what real firms do — and charging different people different prices changes the welfare arithmetic completely.
Price discriminationThe idea
The same pill, at two different prices
Price discrimination
Selling the same product at different prices to different customers.
Combivir sells for about $0.50 a pill in Africa and $12.50 in Europe.
African demand is lower and more elastic, because buyers are on average poorer.
GlaxoSmithKline earns more by charging each market its own price than by charging both the same.
A note on the two cost figures
Chapter 13’s diagrams used AC = $2.50, the average cost once fixed R&D is spread over 80 million pills. The $0.50 here is the marginal cost of one more pill — which is why the African price can sit essentially at cost and still cover it.
Live diagramOne price or two
One price prices the poor market out entirely
$12.50
Pills, lower income
—
Pills, higher income
—
Total pills
—
Total profit
—
—
Price discriminationPrinciples & arbitrage
Two rules, and the thing that breaks them
1a. If the demand curves differ, separate prices beat a single price covering both markets.
1b. Charge the higher price where demand is more inelastic.
2.Arbitrage makes it hard to sustain different prices in different markets.
Arbitrage
Buying low in one market and selling high in another, to take advantage of a price difference for the same good.
PREVENTING ARBITRAGE
The arsenic rumor
Rohm and Haas sold the same plastic at $0.85 a pound for industrial use and $22 a pound for dentures. To stop dentists buying the cheap version, the company spread a rumor that the industrial grade was laced with arsenic.
Price discriminationIt is everywhere
You have been price-discriminated against this week
Movie theaters charge seniors less.
Businesses pay more for software than students do.
Airlines price on whatever correlates with willingness to pay — how far ahead you book, whether you stay a Saturday night.
The more a firm knows about you, the finer it can slice the market.
Income quintile
Family income
Average net price
Low
$0 – $30,000
$1,451
Lower middle
$30,001 – $48,000
$5,480
Middle
$48,001 – $75,000
$5,576
Upper middle
$75,001 – $110,000
$14,702
High
$110,001 and up
$43,967
No aid applied for
About half the student body
$66,540
Price discrimination at Williams College, 2020. A college collects your family’s tax return before quoting a price — which is about as much customer information as any seller ever gets. Data: CollegeCalc.org, from U.S. Department of Education figures.
Live diagramDrag the number of prices
Toward charging every buyer exactly their maximum
Captured by the firmConsumer surplus leftDeadweight loss
1
Pills sold
—
Firm’s profit
—
Consumer surplus
—
Deadweight loss
—
—
Price discriminationIs it bad?
The test is output, not fairness
Price discrimination can be better or worse than single pricing — it depends on what happens to output.
If total output falls or stays the same, it is bad: the same goods, just more of the surplus moved to the seller.
If output increases, total surplus usually increases too — buyers who were priced out entirely now get served.
The fixed-cost argument
Price discrimination helps cover fixed costs. Those costs don’t change with market size, so extra markets mean extra profit — which funds R&D, which creates the incentive to produce more in the first place.
A perfectly price-discriminating monopolist is the strange case: consumers keep zero surplus, yet there is no deadweight loss at all, because the firm wants every worthwhile trade to happen. Efficient, and completely one-sided.
Pricing strategyBundling
The printer is cheap because the ink is not
Bundling
To use one good, the consumer must also buy a second good sold only by the same firm.
HP sells printers below cost and ink far above cost — and the printer only takes HP cartridges.
People with high willingness to pay are the ones who print a lot, so the ink meters their demand: high-volume users pay more per photo than low-volume users.
That is price discrimination without ever asking who you are.
The upside
Lower prices for light users can raise output, and spreading R&D over more users encourages innovation.
The downside
Real resources get spent keeping rivals out of the ink business — pure waste.
Live diagramBundling a package
Why Word and Excel are sold as Office
$120
Amanda buys?
—
Yvonne buys?
—
Bundle revenue
—
Best sold separately
$190
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Pricing strategyVersioning
Deliberately making the cheap version worse
Quality discrimination, or versioning
Offering different versions or quality levels of the same product, to sort customers into groups that can be charged different prices.
The striking part: it can be worth spending money to make a product worse, if that is what separates the two groups.
IBM
The Series E printer
Two laser printers: the regular prints 10 pages a minute, the Series E prints 5. The slow one was the same machine — with parts added to slow it down.
FEDEX
Three times to arrive
Washington to Los Angeles overnight: by 8 am costs about $120; by 10:30 am about half that; by 4:30 pm less again. The package is on the same plane.
Takeaway
What to carry out of Chapter 13
MR < P
A monopolist faces downward-sloping demand, so selling more means cutting price on every unit. It produces where MR = MC and prices off the demand curve.
The cost
Monopolies charge more, produce less, and shrink total surplus — a deadweight loss. The more inelastic the demand, the bigger the markup.
The bargain
Patents trade deadweight loss for innovation; natural monopolies trade it for economies of scale. Neither trade is free.
The policy
Price controls, public ownership and antitrust can all help — but the practice is far messier than the theory.
Price discrimination
Charging different buyers different prices raises profit, and raises welfare too whenever it raises output. Firms must block arbitrage to sustain it; bundling and versioning are both ways of doing it without asking who you are.
The warning
Many monopolies exist for no economic reason at all — simply to transfer wealth to politically powerful elites.
ReferenceKey terms
Key terms at a glance
Market powerAbility to price above MC without inviting entry.
MonopolyA firm with market power.
MR < PSelling more requires cutting price on all units, so MR lies below demand — at twice the slope.
Monopoly ruleProduce where MR = MC; charge the demand-curve price at that Q.
Markup & elasticityMore inelastic demand → larger markup over MC.
Monopoly DWLLost surplus from units between Qm and Qc that never get made.
Natural monopolyOne firm serves the market more cheaply than two, because AC keeps falling.
Price discriminationSelling the same product at different prices to different customers.
ArbitrageBuying low in one market and reselling high in another — what a price discriminator must prevent.
Perfect price discriminationEach buyer charged their maximum willingness to pay: zero consumer surplus, and zero deadweight loss.
BundlingOne good only works with another from the same firm, or products are sold only as a package — either way, buyers are charged for the pair.